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withotherpoliticalpartieswerearrangedinquitedifferentway.The
socialists,whohadtheirownideas,differentfromtheconceptsof
Piłsudski’srepresentatives,wereatypicalexample.Obviously,atthat
timeMiedzińskiforthefirsttimemetIgnacyDaszyński.However,he
neverpositivelydescribedtheirrelations.Hismemoirsofthatperiod
arefullofdescriptionsaboutmisunderstandingsandconfrontations
betweenhimandtheleaderofsocialists.Probably,duringthisvery
periodheretookplaceaquarrel,whichwasthereasonoftheirmutual
antipathy88.
OnOctober1,1918,BogusławMiedzińskiaccordingtotheorder
ofEdwardŚmigły-Rydzwasappointedpoliticalreferentatthe
HeadquartersofthePolishMilitaryOrganization.Thisnomination
meantpoliticalpromotion,especiallytakingintoconsiderationfurther
tasks,entrustedtoMiedziński.InOctober,hetogetherwithŚmigłysat
atthenegotiatingtableconcerningthepoliticalformofthegovernment,
whichhadtobecreatedbyJózefŚwieżyński.Todayitisdifficultto
definetheroleofMiedzińskiinthesenegotiations,whoofficiallyacted
asRydz’sadvisorandtowhatextenthewasresponsibleforthefailure
ofthemediation.Accordingtohismemoirs,histacticsduringthe
negotiationswasbasedonPiłsudski’sconcept:therequirementswere
extremelyhighandwhenthecompetitorswerereadyforconcession,
theyimmediatelyunderwentescalation.Hence,perhaps,Piłsudski’s
flatteringstatementthatinOctober1918uonlyŚwitekusedhiscommon
sense”89.So,whiletheconservativepartiessupportedthecandidature
ofŚmigłytothepostofministerofmilitaryaffairs,thesocialistswere
againsttheleft-wingpartiesinthegovernmentandrefusedtocooperate
withnational-democrats,sotherequirementtotransferthegovernment
fromWarsawtoLublinwasabsolutelyunacceptablefortheright-wing
parties,whichhadaconsiderableinfluenceintheformerCongress
Kingdom90.ItcannotbeconcealedthatatthattimethePolishMilitary
Organizationwascarryingoutitsowngame.ŚmigłyandMiedziński,
wellorientedintherelations,prevailinginWarsaw,andaimingatareal
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