Treść książki
Przejdź do opcji czytnikaPrzejdź do nawigacjiPrzejdź do informacjiPrzejdź do stopki
38
AnettaČaplánová
scarceresources15.FredMcChesneyappliedthisapproachtoactivitiesaimedat
achievingtherentinlessdevelopedcountrieswherethereisoftenahigherlevel
ofcorruptionthanindevelopedcountries16.UsingtheCoasetheorem,Shleifer
andVishnyshowedthatcorruptionmaycontributetoincreasedefficiency17.They
comparedthecorruptionwiththereputationandperceivedbothasmechanisms
forensuringthecompliancewithcontracts.
4.Conclusions
Theanalysiscarriedoutindifferentareasofpublicchoiceallowsmetonow
formulateconclusionsonthefunctioningofdemocraticpoliticalsystemsand
possibilitiesfortheirreform.Theassumptionthatallparticipantsinthepolitical
process(voters,politiciansorbureaucrats)pursuefirsttheirowninterestleadsone
totheconclusionthatachangeofpersonalitiesinpublicpositionswouldnotlead
toafundamentalchangeinthequalityoftheimplementationofpublicpolicies.
Therefore,publicchoicetheoryfocusesontheimportanceofinstitutionalrules,
whichcreateaframeworkforindividualparticipantsinthepoliticalprocess.The
keyfactorintheefforttoincreaseefficiencyisthereforetheinstitutionalframe-
workwithinwhichindividualagentsoperate.
Theanalysisoftheshortcomingsoftheexistingvotingrulesalsohighlights
theneedtocarefullydistinguishbetweensituationsinwhichitispreferabletouse
themechanismsofprivatechoicethroughtheprivatemarketandthosewhereitis
necessarytousemechanismsofcollectivechoice.Sincetheredoesnotexistavot-
ingrulethatsatisfiesallcriteriaimposedontheefficientvotingrule,itisnecessary
toadapttheuseofdifferentvotingrulestothenatureoftheproblemtobedecided.
Publicchoicetheoryasacoherentscientificdisciplinefocusesontheiden-
tificationoftheuniversalprinciplesofpoliticaleconomy.Despitethefactthat
politicalsystemsindifferentcountriesvary,thelogicofthepublicchoicetheory
approachisapplicableirrespectiveofnationalspecifics.Theproblemsofpro-
vidingpublic,collectiveandclubgoods,theproblemofchoosingcoordination
mechanismsandthecollectivedecision-makingprocessmustbedealtwithin
15G.Tullock,op.cit.;A.O.Krueger,ThePoliticalEconomyoftheRentSeekingSociety,“The
AmericanEconomicReview”1974,64(3).
16F.McChesney,MoneyforNothing:Politicians,RentExtraction,andPoliticalExtortion,
HarvardUniversityPress,1997.
17A.Shleifer,R.Vishny,Corruption,“QuarterlyJournalofEconomics”1993,vol.108,no.3,
pp.599–617;A.Shleifer,R.Vishny,PoliticiansandFirms,“QuarterlyJournalofEconomics”1994,
vol.109,no.4,pp.995–1025.
