Treść książki
Przejdź do opcji czytnikaPrzejdź do nawigacjiPrzejdź do informacjiPrzejdź do stopki
36
AnettaČaplánová
interestsoflargecorporations,butalsothoseoftheelectorate–theconsumers.
PeltzmanpaysmoreattentionthanStiglertosupplysidefactorsofregulation.He
studiedfactorsthatmaymotivateregulatorstoadoptmeasuresthatareefficient
despitethelobbyingofproducers.Inthiswayhedevelopedamorebalanced
modelofregulationbasedontheadequateconsiderationoffactorsonboththe
demandandsupplysidesofregulation.
ThepaperbyG.Tullock,TheWelfareCostsofTariffs,Monopolies,andTheft12
changedthethinkingonthesocialcostsofstatemonopolies.InthepaperTullock
madeitclearthatindividualsorgroupsattempttogainaneconomicadvantage
byinfluencinggovernmentpolicy.However,lobbyingthatseekstocreatetrade
barriersorstatemonopoliescarrieswithithighhiddencosts.Theseactivitiesnot
onlyrestrictcompetition,butalsodirectbusinesstalenttowardsunproductive
activities.Thisbehaviourisknownasrentseeking.Tullockwasoneofthefirst
economiststorejecttheprevailingviewthatthesocialcostsofgovernmentregula-
tionarenegligible.
Somemeasuresputforwardbyeconomicpolicymakersareoftenlittleunder-
stoodbythepublic.Oneofthereasonsmaybethatpolicydecisionsareaffected
bytheactivitiesofpressuregroups.InhisbookTheLogicofCollectiveAction,
MancurOlsonshowedwhysomegroupsexertalargerinfluenceonpublicpolicy
thanothers13.Theprovisionofapublicgoodisinlargegroupsassociatedwiththe
free-riderproblem.Onlymembersofsmallgroupsorgroupsthatseektoensure
theprovisionofcollectivegoodsforaclearlydefinedgroupofpeoplehavethe
potentialtoorganise.Thecostsofcollectiveactioninlargegroupsaresignifi-
cantlylargerthaninsmallgroupsandcanbecomeprohibitivelyhigh,inparticular
whencomparedwithadditionalbenefitsobtainedbyeachmemberofalarge
groupwhenwhattheyarestrivingtodoissuccessful.Thisexplainswhyitis
smallgroupsthatofteninfluencepublicdecision-makingprocesses.However,this
influencemayleadtotheadoptionofmeasuresthatruncountertotheinterestsof
themajorityofthepublic.
Duringthe20thcentury,alsoduetothedevelopmentsintherealeconomy,
theattentionofeconomistsexaminingthepublicsectorturnedtoanalysingthe
shortcomingsofmarketmechanismsandthewaysgovernmentcanaddressthem.
Representativesofpublicchoicetheoryandofthenewinstitutionaleconomicsin
generalcontributedagreatdealtothedebateonmarketfailures.Inthiscontextthe
interestofpublicchoicetheoryfocusesonmanyaspectsofthedecision-making
processesoutsideoftheprivatemarket.
12G.Tullock,op.cit.
13M.Olson,TheLogicofCollectiveAction:PublicGoodsandtheTheoryofGroups,Harvard
UniversityPress,Cambridge1965.
