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PolandBetweenGermanyandRussia
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appearedinthe1780sinPrussia’spoliciestowardRussia.Thiscouldbecon-
sideredthenewPrussianeasternpolicy.GivenRussia’sentanglementinwar
withtheOttomanstateandthesupportitwasreceivingfromVienna,theidea
emergedinBerlinofanalliancewithPolandtoserveasacounterweightto
growingimperialambitionsofRussia,furtherstrengthenedbythesupportof
Austria.EwaldFriedrichvonHertzberg,thenPrussianministerofforeignaf-
fairs,wasagreatproponentofsucharapprochementwithWarsawandthere-
formcampintheSejm,thePolishparliament.3Hertzbergtriedunsuccessfully
topersuadeFrederickWilliamIItoaccepthisideathatexcessiveweakening
ofPoland,nottomentionitspartitioning,wasnotinPrussia’sinterests.Such
developmentswouldmean,afterall,thedisappearanceofthenaturalbuffer
dividingPrussiafromRussia.Intheresultingconsequenceofsuchevents,an
overgrownRussia,directlyborderingPrussiainCentralEurope,couldrein
inBerlin’simperialpolicyinEurope(asinfactwouldhappenaquarterof
acenturylater,asaresultoftheNapoleonicwars,thepoliciesofAlexan-
derItowardPrussiaandthenewpost-ViennaorderontheContinent).Thus
HertzbergconsideredthatPrussia,inanalliancewithFranceandthereform
partyinPoland,shouldstrivetomaintaintheFirstRepublic.Thesecondand
thirdpartitionsofPolandeliminatedthepossibilityofrealizingsuchapolicy.
However,thisfirst,unsuccessfulattempttodrawWarsawandBerlintogether
inanewconstellationofforcesinEuropeopenedthequestion,whichwould
periodicallyrecurredinthePolishpoliticaldebate,astothedegreetowhich
itmightbepossibleforPolandtobreakdownthefatalnatureofitslocation
betweeneastandwestbyallyingitselfwithoneofitstwoneighborslPrussia
orRussia.Thechoice,preferredbythereformcampandespeciallybyIgnacy
Potocki,ofdrawingclosertoPrussiaagainstRussia,ledtoanalliancein1790
butwasburdenedbytheconcessionsofToruńandGdańsktoBerlin.Laterit
wasjudged,byFatherWalerianKalinkaamongothers,tohavebeenamistake.4
BerlindidnotintendtorealizeanalliancewithPolandlasidefromthepos-
sibleadvanceofthePrussianarmythroughterritoriesoftheRepublicland
theactivismintheSejminthisperiodonlyincreasedthedistrustofCath-
erineII,hasteningPoland’sdownfall.Itwouldalsoseemthat,aftertheevents
of1789,thereformmovementinPolandwasperceivedinBerlinprimarily
throughtheprismoftherevolutionarythreatunderminingthelegalisticorder
ofEuropeanmonarchies.TheideaofsupportingWarsawagainstRussia,then,
couldnotenjoymuchpopularityatthecourtofFrederickWilliamII,where
thespreadofdangerousrevolutionaryideaswasfeared.AsthewriterJoachim
ChristophFriedrichSchulzlaterobserved,inhisappraisalofPolishhopesfor
closertieswithPrussia,utheleadersofthePolishrevolution,inaccordance
withtheirnationalcharacter,demonstratedrathertheirferventimaginations
thansoberdeliberations[ł]TheydidnottakeintoaccountthatPrussiahad
onlymomentarilyextendeditshandtoPolandbecauseitneededit.[ł]In
theirinconceivableblindness,theyforgotthepoliticaltruth:thataweaker