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AnthonyLevitas
WhatexplainsPoland’ssuccess?Anddoesthis
successtellusanythingusefulabout“decentra-
lisation”andgoodgovernance?Inthefollowing,
Isuggestanswerstobothquestionsbyexamining
Poland’ssuccessagainstthebackgroundofthe
dominantdiscoursesusedtojustifydecentralisation
effortsandtheexplanationsofwhytheseefforts
havesooftenbeendisappointing.
Thefirstdiscoursecomesfromtheliterature
onfiscalfederalism.Thisliteraturemaintainsthat
decentralizationshouldproducebettergovernanceif
thefunctionsofdifferentlevelsofgovernmentcan
beclearlyseparatedfromeachother,ifthebenefit
areasoflocalpublicservicescanbealignedwith
thejurisdictionsthatprovidethem,andiflocal
servicesarepaidforbylocaltaxes.Underthese
conditions,theargumentruns,decentralization
willpromotegoodgovernancebygivingcitizens
themeans(elections),theincentives(taxes),and
theinformation(clearlydelineatedresponsibilities)
necessarytoholdpoliticiansaccountablefortheir
performance(Musgrave,1959;Oates,1972;Ter-
Minassian,1997).
Inthisdiscourse,theinabilitytogettheserules
rightexplainsdecentralisation’sdisappointments
andisgenerallyattributedtoafailureof“political
will”(Smoke,2001).Moreparticularly,difficulties
makinglocalgovernmentspayforthemselves
throughlocaltaxesissaidtoproducetransfer
dependency,fiscalirresponsibilityandmacro-
economicinstability,whiletheinabilitytoclearly
separatefunctionsacrosslevelsofgovernmentis
thoughttoconfusethetaxpayingelectorate(Tanzi,
2002;Rodden,2005).Similarly,themisalignment
ofbenefitareaswithpoliticaljurisdictionsisheld
responsiblefornegativespill-overs,fragmentation,
andpoliticalgridlock(Prud’homme1995;Treisman,
2007).
Theseconddiscourseaboutdecentralisation
islessconcernedwithrulesthanempowerment.
Ifcitizenscanbeequippedwiththecapacities,
resourcesandpowersnecessarytogovernthem-
selves,decentralisationshouldwidenthepublic
sphere,deependemocracyandimprovepublic
services(Cheema&Rondinelli2007;Connerly,
2009;Fung&Wright,2003).Heredecentralisation’s
disappointmentsareusuallyattributedtotheintra-
ctabilityofexistingpowerrelationships:totheease
withwhichdominantelitescaptureorsubvertlocal
governments(Bardhan&Mookergee,2006;Gibson,
2012)and/ortothedifficultiesofcapacitating
thedisenfranchised(McGee&Gaventz,2010;
Fung&Wright,2003).
ThesuccessofdecentralisationinPoland
cannoteasilybeunderstoodwithineitherofthese
frameworks.Ontheonehand,thearchitects
ofPoland’sreformsignoredmanyoffiscalfe-
deralism’scentralpolicyprescriptions,making
localgovernmentsheavilydependentontransfers
andleavingthedivisionofresponsibilitiesinmany
areas-mostnotablyineducation-profoundly
confused.Ontheotherhand,thereislittleevidence
thattheprocesswaseitherdrivenforwardby,or
hasresultedin,wide-spreadcivicengagement.
Instead,asmallgroupofpolicy-makersdesigned
andimplementedthereformsfromabove.More-
over,theyhadmodestexpectationsaboutcitizen
participation-expectationsthathavelargely
provedwell-founded.
Sohowisitthatlocalgovernmentreform
inPolandhasworkedsowellintheabsence
ofeithertheintergovernmentalrulesorthepopular
engagementthatthedominantliteraturesplaceat
thefoundationofbothdecentralisation’snorma-
tivevirtuesanditspracticaldifficulties?Or,put
anotherway,whyhaven’tPolishlocalgovernments
descendedintoamiasmaoffiscalimprudence
andrent-seekingifneithertherulesgoverning
thesystemnorthecitizensoccupyingitcan
bereasonablyidentifiedastheprimaryagents
ofaccountability?
Inthefollowing,IarguethatPoland’ssuccess
istheproductofaremarkablyself-conscious
strategyofinstitutionbuildingbyagroupofpolicy
makerswhosharedaspecificvisionofwhatlocal
governmentreformwasabout.Unlikemany
oftheircounterpartsintheregion(andbeyond),
theydidnotprimarilyregardlocalgovernments
asrepositoriesofdemocraticvirtueorvehiclesfor
directcivicparticipation.Nordidtheythinkoflocal
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ZarządzaniePubliczne/PublicGovernance3(45)/2018
