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particularpositionsofpower.BesidestheBalticandtheBlackSeatheatres,
Russiamayinthenearfutureattempttoutiliseitsstrategicadvantageinthe
Arctic,whereitcontinuestoincreasemilitaryactivitiesandinfrastructure,
despitetheabsenceofanythreatstoitsinterests.
VincenzoCamporini
AFewThingstoBeConsideredinViewoftheWarsawSummit.....31
Firstofall,thesummitshouldreaffirminpracticalandconcreteterms
NATOsolidarity,callingonthenationstoprovidetheircontributionoutside
theirspecificgeographicalproximity.Inorganisationalterms,athorough
reconsiderationofthefinancialmechanismsoftheAllianceappearstobe
necessary,stoppingtokeepthe“costsliewheretheyfall”principleasatruth
offaith.Also,anewtaskshouldbegiventotheSecretaryGeneraltoreviseand
possiblypartiallyreversetherecentreorganisationoftheNATOCommand
Structureinordertogranteffectivelyaconsistentmatchwiththeagreed
levelofambition,which,inthepresentstrategicscenarios,seemstobemore
realisticthanever.Andfinally,onthepoliticalside,anewapproachshould
betestedwithRussia,makingitclearthattherearenohostileintentionsfrom
NATOandthatMoscowhasnoreasontobeaggressiveincountriessuchas
UkraineandGeorgia,withwhomnegotiatedagreementsmustbefoundand
compliedwithinordertosolvethecontroversies.
JacekDurkalec,MatthewKroenig
NATO’sNuclearDeterrence:ClosingCredibilityGaps............37
IfNATOwishestodeterRussianaggressionreliably,itsdeterrenceand
defencepolicymustonceagaincontainaseriousnuclearcomponent,and
WesternleadersmustbeginthedifficulttaskofrevisitingNATOnuclear
deterrencepoliciesandpostures.TheNATOWarsawSummitprovidesthe
idealopportunitytofillthemostcriticalgapsinNATO’snuclearpostureand
toinitiatethelongerprocessofnuclearadaptation.
MariaRaquelFreire,LicíniaSimão
(Re)focusingtheAtlanticAlliance:
ReframingSecurityReadingsintoaPeaceAgenda................51
BringinganewreadingtocollectivedefenceaftertheColdWarallowed,
amongotherthings,anexpansionofNATO’stasksaswellasmembership.
Thisbeingsaid,itishightimefordeepreflectionabouttheopportunities
andlimitationsfortheAlliancefromtheperspectiveofthepromotionof
peace,morethan25yearsaftertheendofthebipolarorder.Drawingon
theintroductoryremarkstothisspecialissue,thepaperwillfocuson1)the
strategicdifferencesbetweenasecurityversusapeaceagendaforNATO
inthecontextofincreasinglytransnationalandcomplexthreats,2)Russia
asbothanecessaryallyandachallengeratNATO’sborders,including
itspositioningregardinga“sharedneighbourhood”withtheEuropean
Union(EU)andtheAtlanticAlliance,aswellasMoscow’sinvestmentin
thedevelopmentofmilitaryalliancestotheeast(theCollectiveSecurity
TreatyOrganisation,orCSTO),3)theMiddleEastasageostrategicarea
wheretheconflationofcompetinginterests,normsandvalueshasrevealed
complexdynamics,bothin-countryandregional,andimpactedontheNATO
