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Analysisofsubstantivecausesofblackoutsinelectricalpowersystems
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powerinfrastructure.Itisnotedthatappropriatepreparationtotheblackoutscould
decreasethefrequencyofoccurrenceofthelargestones.Electricpowercompanies
wouldbemorewillingtorunthecontrolledloadsheddingunderthesystem
overloadconditionsprovidingthattheconsumersarepreparedtothewould-be
feeder’sdisconnection.Thesameresultcouldbeattainedbyallowingthehigher
numberofthesmall-scaleshutdowns.AccordingtotheAmerica,Canadianreport,
permissionforsuchstepswouldhighlylimitthereachoftheblackoutdated
August14,2003uptothesmallsectionsoftheOhiostate.
Table1.Listofselectedgreatblackouts
2003,5:50
November
September
September
August18,
August14,
January6-
23,2003
28,2003
May24,
10,1996
9,1965
August
7,1998
Date
2003
2005
AM
US(North-Eastregion)
Russia/Moscow,Tula,
USandpartofCanada
BritishColumbia)and
SwedenandDenmark
andCanada(Ontario)
Canada(Albertaand
KalugaandRiazan
US(Westregion),
Canada(Quebec)
areas-24towns
Country/area
Georgia
Mexico
Italy
ca28000MWofdemand
Blackoutof20000MW
approx.,over2000MW
30m.peopleaffected,
totalpowershortage
7,5m.consumers,
1,7m.consumers
50m.consumers,
ofcustomerload
of61000MW
40m.approx..
4m.approx.
Shutdowns
1,5-2m.
Denmarkandwithin6.5
DeliveryfromUCTEto
withinonedayapprox.
within3weeksinnon-
Powersupplyrestored
Powersupplyrestored
Italyresumedwithin4
Powersupplyrestored
restorationtoallloads
hourinentireaffected
within13hoursafter
available,restoration
hours,powersupply
Voltagerestoration
within1.5hourin
Datanotavailable
Detaileddatanot
Durationtime
within9hours
urbanareas
took2days
breakdown
area
